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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to reflect on psychological, ethical and political implications of new 
materialisms (Barad, Bennett, Coole, Frost) in the context of expanded and accelerated regimes of 
measurement as part of a technological governance of the human.  As new materialists are 
committed to both epistemic and political emancipation, I first analyse theoretical, in particular 
epistemological, foundations of new materialism. The new materialism has achieved liberating 
epistemic effects in criticizing self-referential discursive and socio-constructionist agendas. It 
argued instead for a return to material and somatic realities. However, I examine whether its flat 
ontology, its epistemology of de-differentiation of the human and non-human, even non-living 
agencies and commitments into a principle of immanence, provide appropriate means to critically 
assess ethical and political implications of entanglements of humans with the historically- produced 
technologies and social worlds in general. The next question to be discussed is whether a return 
(nevertheless a discursive one) to material and somatic realities can in itself protect those very 
vulnerable realities. As horizontal ontology invokes a horizontal normativity which cannot serve as 
a foundation for emancipatory projects, it follows that normativity needs other sources beyond the 
new materialism paradigm. Thus, I argue that such a weak or insecure position of normativity within 
the new materialisms affects any concept of human subject, regardless of its entanglements, and any 
project of emancipation. I conclude these critical analyses by claiming that the new materialism’s 
epistemological and political emancipatory promises cannot be fulfilled by means provided by the 
new materialism itself. 
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Introduction 
New materialism (or rather materialisms – for example, Barad, 2003, 2007; Bennett, 2010; 
Coole & Frost, 2010; Tuin, 2011) emerged at the beginning of the third millennium, in the 
strong belief that “it is now time to subject objectivity and material reality to a …radical 
reappraisal… and to respond to insistent demands for more materialist modes of analysis 
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and for new ways of thinking about matter and processes of materialization …” (Coole & 
Frost, 2010, p. 2).  
New materialism is understood as a material turn, a turn toward matter and against 
linguistic, cultural and discursive turns which dominated social and human sciences over 
the past half century or so. Within their turn to forgotten matter, to matter that matters and 
“vibrant matter” (Bennett, 2010), new materialists are also arguing for rehabilitation of 
vitalist conceptions, whose origin they trace back to Bergson, Spinoza and even to Lucretius 
(Bennett, 2010). Meantime, there are also versions of new materialism which are described 
as speculative materialism (Meillassoux, 2008). This and other choices of new materialists 
show that they do not follow the orthodoxy of history of philosophy ̶ instead they advance 
topics and authors more or less marginalized in master narratives inherited so far.  
Even though many forerunners of new materialism have been identified and adopted, from 
antiquity through modernity (Spinoza, La Mettrie, H.D. Thoreau) to the twentieth  century 
(Bergson), in the last decades of the twentieth century several authors articulated ideas 
which became core concepts of new materialisms. In that regard Gilles Deleuze & Felix 
Guattari (1977; 1987), Donna Haraway (1985) and Bruno Latour (1996) are particularly 
important. What they have in common is a turn away from a centration on human subjects 
and articulation of conceptual interests in non-humans, even non-living objects and 
inorganic processes. They transgressed inherited divisions and dichotomies such as 
humans–non-humans, human agency–things, subject–object, and nature–culture. Instead of 
a centuries-long fascination with humans, these authors share a fascination with technics 
and machines, beyond their use as tools of productions of material goods – instead technics 
and machines are seen as powerful actors in desiring-production (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1977), or as actors in networks (Latour, 1996), or even as building new creatures – cyborgs 
(Haraway, 1985). New materialists refer with acknowledgment to Michel Foucault’s 
research, especially on body-disciplining practices. (Foucault, 1977). New materialisms 
have been fruitfully adopted also by feminist theories (Tuin, 2011).    
At the the beginning of the new millennium, the context of the emergence of the new 
materialism provided new impetus for engaging with the previously addressed issues, but 
invited articulation of new concerns as well. Rapid technological developments are 
paralleled by rising ecological problems. Both paths are not just external context of the wide 
field of new materialisms. I would say that they have substantially shaped the social genesis 
of the new materialisms and assumed an important place on their theoretical agenda. The 
theoretical agenda is accompanied by a political one, which could be considered as a quite 
radical one. If it is correct to consider new materialisms as discoursive responses to 
entanglements of technological development with environmental decay and social crisis, it 
is then even more important to critically examine whether such responses as provided by 
new materialisms could contribute to altering the threatening path of development – even 
more so in that many new materialists’ critical engagement with the existing order, and 
envisioning of alternate developments, is an indispensable part of their agenda. Rekret states 
that “the fundamental political import of the new materialist theories lies with their attempts 
to re-articulate what it means to be a political agent and the terrain upon which political 
struggle might be located” (2018, p. 51). 
Therefore, it should not remain unnoticed that what is described as the material turn stands 
for many other turns – turns both towards and against. As its achievement could count that 
“there is no discipline in the humanities and social sciences that has not had some 
New Materialism, Technophilia and Emancipation  •   247 
 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGIES • Vol. 1, No. 1 • 2021 
www.Istp-irtp.com 
engagement with these new materialisms, and some engagement in the sciences has also 
been important” – as stated by Devellenes and Dillet while questioning new materialisms 
(2018, p. 7) But the question to be raised is whether in this way weaknesses of new 
materialisms – and the present paper aims to show some of them – have affected the social 
and human sciences as well. Further consequences could be their lasting incapability of 
properly addressing fundamental problems that humanity is facing.  
The core agenda of new materialisms 
The context of emergence and the novelty claim 
New materialisms have addressed many issues  ̶  ontological, anthropological, 
epistemological, ethical, political, economic, geological, biological, and ecological ones. 
They refer to philosophy  (Greek philosophy, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Henry David Thoreau, 
Bergson, Deleuze, Guattari, Latour).They are very indebted to advances in natural sciences, 
especially referring to the quantum physics of Niels Bohr and generalizing its principle of 
indeterminacy by applying it to conceptions of the body and the social world (Barad, 2007). 
However, developments in the social and human sciences since the 1970s, characterized 
mostly by socio-constructionist approaches, are the target of their critique. They hoped to 
offer “escape from the limits of social constructivism” (Rekret, 2018, p. 58). Beyond that, 
new materialists have challenged basic assumptions underlying the modern world view and 
brought about quite radical changes in ways of thinking about basic categories of humans 
and things. On the agenda of new materialism is, among other challenging issues, 
acknowledgment of the “ubiquitous intensity of impersonal affect,”, as stated by one of the 
leading figures of new materialism, Jane Bennett (2010, p. xiii). The program of new 
materialism includes re-articulation of the concept of the political, the political agent, and 
political struggles, which means refusal to “reduce political agency to human agency” 
(Bennett, 2010, p. xv; italics in original). 
The general program of new materialism, as described by Jane Bennett, is oriented toward 
three main tasks: 
 
to paint a positive ontology of vibrant matter, which  stretches received concepts of  
agency, action, and freedom sometimes to the breaking point; (2) to dissipate the onto-theological 
binaries of life/matter, human/animal, will/determination, and organic/inorganic using arguments 
and other rhetorical means to induce in human bodies an aesthetic-affective openness to material 
vitality; and (3) to sketch a style of political analysis that can better account for the contributions 
of nonhuman actants. (Bennett, 2010, p. x)  
 
The new materialism has emerged in an age that highly values novelty and plurality, even 
though very often without any interest to justify claims that qualitatively new and different 
options are available at all, not to speak of their values, viability, and availability to all 
individuals. Most importantly, the new materialism forgets that in fundamental questions of 
societal organization all attempt to try alternatives to hegemonic neo-liberal order have been 
systematically prevented or sanctioned, even by military means. It is worth reminding 
ourselves in this context that the new materialism’s emancipatory projects coincide with 
long-lasting harsh economic sanctions against the Cuban socialist project or Venezuealan 
attempts to resist adoption of a capitalist system – to mention just two rare examples of 
alternative societal projects. And decisions to impose sanctions against people in those 
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countries have been taken by human subjects, not by assemblages of things – even by a 
powerful single person. It is true, effectiveness of such measures is possible thanks to a geo-
political system, whose existence and perpetuation depends again on human subjects, those 
powerful enough to impose their will and those helpless to change such a system or even 
being forced to sustain it. 
The new materialism is preferably understood as a plurality of new materialisms (Coole & 
Frost, 2010; Devellennes & Dittel, 2018). To use a favourite term of new materialism itself, 
i.e., assemblage, it could be said that there is an assemblage of materialisms. Beyond that 
and more importantly, new materialisms are committed to a pluralization of agency, for long 
time considered to be unique to humans. But it was their primary interest in matter and 
processes of materialization that gave the name to their program intended to bring about 
many reappraisals. 
In view of an almost pandemic spread of discourses of pluralism, the task of defining new 
materialism is not so easy. Further, it is not so easy to define an approach that is so eager to 
transgress or abolish divisions. And definitions necessarily presuppose making divisions. In 
the context of questioning the new materialisms Devellennes and Dittel (2018) suggest three 
criteria whose fulfillment should qualify for acknowledgment of new materialism: novelty 
in theory, ontological claims regarding matter, and methodological consequences of 
ontological claims. 
The insistence on novelty, fixed in the very name new materialism, contextualizes new 
materialisms as a product of the epoch obsessed by novelty. As novelty has generally a very 
high marketing value, it means that claims of novelty could be often more motivated by that 
incentive than founded on a proper justification. This is also a challenge posed to new 
materialisms. It is striking that even new materialists (Bennett, Coole, Frost) who 
acknowledge quite many precedents for their theories, including materialists in the past, 
nevertheless consider their materialism a new materialism.  
In order to assess the claim of novelty defended by new materialists and their critique 
directed against the historical materialism I shall compare more extensively new 
materialisms and historical materialism. The justification for this choice is derived from 
both new materialisms and historical materialism. Among materialisms in the past Marxian 
historical materialism is particularly important – thanks to its theoretical achievements and 
socio-political influence. The claim of novelty of new materialisms has been put forward 
also regarding Marxian historical materialism. And this characterization occurs again within 
a discoursive domain, which this time includes a longer historical perspective comparing to 
cultural or socio-constructionist turns targeted by the new materialisms’ critique. However, 
it seems as if new materialists don’t acknowledge that their critique occurs in a discoursive 
domain, i. e. that a discoursive referent is indispensable for the material turn argued for by 
new materialists. 
Given the emancipatory agendas that both Marxist historical materialism and new 
materialisms advocate, this aspect of positioning of new materialisms deserves special 
reflective attention. Diana Coole (2013) coined the term “capacious historical materialism” 
to express her understanding of political capacities of the new materialism. However, some 
critical authors argue that it is necessary to take into account some external conditions in 
assessing attitude of new materialists toward Marxian historical materialism.   
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Why is it that there is a need for a clean break with the past for our topic in particular? It may be 
that the spectre of Marxism looms large over theories of materialism, and that it has become 
difficult (particularly in the United States) to use Marxism in a critical and engaged manner. It is 
certainly evident that Coole, Frost, and Bennett have all been influenced in part by Marx and 
Marxism more generally, but are reluctant to bring this connection to the fore of their work.  
(Devellennes & Dillet, 2018, p. 8)  
 
There is more to be examined regarding relationship of new materialists to historical 
materialism, even more so as some leading new materialists, for example Jane Bennett, 
insist that “dogged resistance to anthropocentrism is perhaps the main difference between 
the vital materialism I pursue and this kind of historical materialism.” (Bennett, 2010, p. 
xvi).  
However, it is worth letting Marx (and Engels) speak for themselves about their historical 
materialism. It should be recalled that Marx and Engels in their time argued for new 
materialism, after pointing out limitations of “all previous materialism” represented in their 
case mostly by Feuerbach. The main objection made by Marx against Feuerbachian 
materialism is its neglect of an active, productive role of human subjects in their relation to 
the world.  In the first thesis on Feuerbach Marx stated: 
  
The chief defect of all previous materialism (including Feuerbach’s ) is that the object actuality, 
sensuousness is conceived only in the form of the object or perception [Anschauung], but not as 
sensuous human activity, practice [Praxis], not subjectively. (Marx, 1845/1994, p. 99; italics in 
original) 
 
This is also a crucial feature that distinguishes humans from animals as it is through such 
attitudes and practice that humans create their history. This distinction is very important to 
historical materialism, and this is one of distinctions new materialists argued against, in the 
framework of their general critique of anthropocentrism. However, some questions are 
pressing in that regard: can any critique of anthropocentrism justify the abolition of the 
distinction between human and animal species? Are we better equiped to grasp the world if 
we abandon this distinction? Are we better equiped to address social, epistemic or 
hermeneutic injustices if we abandon distinctions between humans, animals and things and 
give voices to things instead to humans?  
Marxist historical materialism showed that a materialist account of history, even a radical 
one, is compatible with the acknowledgment of distinctions between humans and animals, 
and things. And Marx has in no way ignored the role of things in human world, neither has 
he ignored nature. But he analysed things within a historical-materialist framework, 
showing that human labor and social relations determine their values. In the same way 
nature is seen as an object of historically changeable human activity. From such a 
perspective Marx has warned of fetishising things and naturalizing social phenomena. Both 
fallacies continue to characterize much of contemporary consciousness and scientific 
theoretizations.  
Agencies in new materialisms  
It seems that new materialisms are not aware of the dangers of fetishizing things and 
dehumanizing humans. To them, matter matters in itself, things have their agentic 
capabilities, and humans have to retreat from the central position. It was La Mettrie in the 
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eighteenth century who subsumed humans under machines–“man-a machine” –and ascribed 
agentic features to a wide realm. As Jane Bennett acknowledges her indebtedness to La 
Mettrie, the question arises: what is then new in new materialisms? It could be that advances 
of technology make the same old ideas of materialism more attractive. 
In new materialism things have been accredited surplus value because they are 
conceptualized as thing-power, having  
 
the capacity ... to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of 
their own ... Thing-power gestures toward the strange ability of ordinary, man-made items to 
exceed their status as objects and to manifest traces of independence or aliveness, constituting 
the outside of our own experience. (Bennett, 2010: viii; xvi)  
 
Bennett gives an example of agentic capacities of omega-3 fatty acid “affecting” human 
mood (Bennett, 2010, p. vii). This extension of agentic capacities means that humans are 
deprived of specific agentic capabilities. However, in a kind of a non-recognized self-
refuting move, new materialists rely on strategic anthropomorphism: “We need to cultivate 
a bit of anthropomorphism – the idea that human agency has some echoes in nonhuman 
nature – to counter the narcissism of humans in charge of the world” (Bennett, 2010, p. xvi). 
Beyond the self-confidently proclaimed overcoming of the traditional epistemological and 
ethical division between humans and things, to which new materialists are committed, I 
think that a reference to the psychological developmental processes in the relation between 
humans and things could be epistemically fruitful for a critical reappraisal. For human 
agentic capabilities are not given, they have to be developed, and for that to be achieved 
different kinds of social and cultural tools, including things, are needed. Those tools are not 
mere things, they can fulfill their developmental function only if they are transformed 
through human activity. In that way they change both the human subjects and the world they 
live in. Symbolic tools (words) from tools of interpersonal communication become 
internalized as tools of mental operations  (verbal thinking, logical memory) (Vygotsky, 
1931/1997). Thus it is not matter in itself that matters, it is human activity that brings it 
about that some matter matters and some other matter or matter at another place and time 
does not matter. Paradoxical as it may seem, new materialisms cannot hold consistently to 
their own main claim that matter matters in itself. Needless to say that flat ontology does 
not secure that humans matter – at least in social practices not all human matter(iality) 
matters. This is psychologically and ethically very relevant.  
The political and ecological agenda  
The difficulties of the new materialisms become even more complicated when it comes to 
their political agenda. Jane Bennett (2010) explicates: “The political project …is,…to 
encourage more intelligent and sustainable engagements with vibrant matter and lively 
things. A guiding question: How would politica responses to public problems change were 
we to take seriously the vitality of (nonhuman) bodies? ”(p. vii). 
However, it is worth mentioning some previous insights. Marx has rightly pointed out that 
old materialisms which does not comprehend sensual human activity as constituting 
sensuous objects cannot transcend the level of individual subjects: “The highest point 
attained by perceptual materialism, that is, materialism that does not comprehend 
sensuousness as practical activity, is the view of separate individuals and civil society.” 
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(Marx 1845/1994, p.100). In the next, tenth thesis on Feuerbach it is clarified that a reference 
to society is what substantially distinguishes Marx’s historical materialism from the old 
materialism: “The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society [bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft]: the standpoint of the new is human society [menschliche Gesellschaft] or 
socialized humanity [vergesellschaftete Menschheit]” (Marx 1845/1994, p.101; German 
expressions added for clarification). 
As new materialisms go even further back than old materialism in Marxian view, and while 
adopting assumptions of redistributed agency, and collapse of the distinction of matter and 
thought, they fall even below “the view of separate individuals”. Is it then possible to reach 
socio-political realm new materialists are striving for? In his critical assessment of political 
implications of new materialism Rekret, relying on Marx, questions the feasibility of 
political agenda of new materialisms: 
 
Taking my cue from Marx, this essay affirms the limitations of new materialist attempts to 
reconcile if not collapse the cultural and the natural, thought and world. Posing the question of 
‘separation’, or rather its neglect, I will claim, has profound effects on the terrain and scale upon 
which the political is theorized. It is my central contention that failure to pose the question of 
‘separation’ in materialist terms obscures the political processes by which abstractions such as 
‘man’ or ‘nature’ are constituted and, accordingly, produces a political voluntarism that fails to 
confront its own conditions.  (Rekret, 2018, p. 52) 
 
Marx’s task was to provide a materialist account of human history that would allow for a 
more self-conscious and free involvement of humans in making their future history in which 
there will be no exploitation, no repression, no social inequalities. Obviously, it is neither 
matter nor animals that prevent such a course of history, but humans, i.e. the way they 
organize their societies, their means and relations of production. For the “human society” 
to be developed it is necessary, in ‘Marx’s view, to lay down foundation for “practical-
critical “ activity already at the basic level of relations of humans to objects. 
The primary subject-matter of historical materialism is the historical constitution of humans 
and human society. It is the most important achievement to connect materialism and history, 
i.e., to develop materialism as a historical materialism. In the long history of materialism 
(Lange, 1866/1974) elaboration of this relation was missing.  
It is worth quoting a longer passage from The German Ideology, which Marx and Engels 
wrote in 1845/1846, but it remained unpublished until 1932. It is there that they first exposed 
main ideas of historical materialism, even though in Engels’ view, Marx’s theses on 
Feuerbach are “the first document in which is deposited the brilliant germ of the new world 
outlook”  (Engels, 1888, no pagination). 
 
The premises...are the real individuals, their actions, and their material conditions of life, those 
they find existing as well as those which they produce through their actions...The first premise 
of all human history, of course, is the existence of living human individuals. (The first historical 
act of these individuals, the act by which they distinguish themselves from animals is not the fact 
that they think but the fact that they begin to produce their means of subsistence.)...All 
historiography must proceed from these natural bases and their modification in the course of 
history through the actions of men. (Marx & Engels, 1845-1846/1994, p. 107; italics in original) 
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In historical materialism human individuals, through their actions, produce changes in 
matter, in things, but also in themselves and in other individuals. Humans are necessarily 
oriented toward objects, their actions are object-dependent. Object-directedness of human 
psychic processes, i. e. intentionality is a general structural feature of psyche, as defined 
already in scholastics (Thomas Aquinas), and then taken over by Brentano and Husserl’s 
phenomenology. Object-directedness has become a kind of materialist intentionality in 
historical materialism. It is important to stress that by acting on things human actors change 
themselves as well. Thus, historical materialism has shown that history is a process of self-
constitution of humans. Of course, there are limits to possible changes and changes do not 
necessarily correspond to human intentions. The producers can be and indeed are alienated 
from their products, even from themselves. But in spite of all these complexities, 
mediations, and alienation, to historical materialism there are and cannot be any other 
agencies of historical development than humans themselves – of course, humans as social 
beings.   
In contrast, new materialisms have shifted agentic productivity to non-humans and things. 
There is no doubt that this makes new materialisms very different from historical 
materialism. But what is the sense of the proclaimed “new” ? I would argue that it is a new 
that is regressive, i.e., that abandons important insights provided by historical materialism 
into human, subjective activity in producing and constituting objects in human worlds. 
Paradoxically, it is a “new” that is actually the old one. Jane Bennett indeed used an 
ontogenetic regressive comparison to position her claim that “vital materiality can start to 
take shape. Or, rather, it can take shape again, for a version of this idea already found 
expression in childhood experiences of a world populated by animate things rather than 
passive objects”(Bennett, 2010, p. vii). 
It is important to bear in mind that analysis of commodity allowed Marx to reconstruct the 
ways in which capitalist society functions. He elucidated the deep entanglements of nature, 
things, humans and society. But if commodity is translated back into self-containing things, 
as suggested by new materialists, the result will be a juxtaposition of plurality of different 
things which should be allowed to perform their own intra-activity. However, the intra-
activity of things can never replace the actions of human political subjects.   
Does the new redistribution of agency (and responsibility) at the expense of humans, and in 
favour of non-humans and things, make new materialism more capable to address ecological 
and societal problems? Jane Bennett answers that question: ”why advocate the Vitality of 
matter? Because my hunch is that the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter 
feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption” 
(Bennett, 2010, p. ix). 
In fact, the dominant expansive instrumental attitude of humans toward nature has to be 
changed as it has devastated natural resources and produced climate change, yet it has not 
abolished hunger and poverty. In that sense, ecological concerns of the new materialists are 
justified. But they are not quite new: before the new materialists Gregory Bateson (1972) 
warned that such an instrumental and arrogant attitude toward the environment and nature 
would lead to annihilation of humanity. But this is not just a question of new concepts as 
rightly argued by Rekret: 
 
conceptual abstraction or the symbolic distinction of nature and culture are themselves the result 
of the forcible separation of direct producers from their means of production and are continuous 
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with those social relations…new materialists underestimate both the conditions for overcoming 
those mediations but also the conditions of substantive social transformation. (Rekret, 2018, p. 
55) 
 
Paradoxically enough, in that way, the new materialists, beyond their claims, come closer 
to discursive approaches than to materialist accounts. In other words, to advocate the 
“vitality of matter,” as mentioned above by Bennett, is a discursive gesture. Even new 
materialists cannot dispense with discursive means, but it seems as if they ignore both their 
own indispensable discursive embededness and the limits of discursive accounts which 
certainly cannot be sufficient to change the material and social conditions under which the 
conquest of nature is going on. In spite of their very critical attitude toward linguistic, 
cultural and socio-constructivist turns, as well as to older forms of materialism, new 
materialists lay claim to being adherentst of a positive ethos. Thus, the new materialists’ 
insufficiently reflective critique is paralled by their positive ethos: 
 
The prevailing ethos of new materialist ontology is consequently more positive and constructive 
than critical or negative: it sees its task as creating new concepts and images of nature that affirm 
matter's immanent vitality. Such thinking is accordingly post- rather than anti-Cartesian. It avoids 
dualism or dialectical reconciliation by espousing a monological account of emergent, generative 
material being. (Coole & Frost, 2018, p. 7; italics added) 
 
However, it should be noted that the positive ethos  ̶  and its psychological articulation in 
form of positive psychologies should not be forgotten in this context  ̶ has beyond its 
seductive surface some other facets as well. By focusing on the positive, again with 
discursive means, and drawing attention away from problems and conflicts, the real 
problems will not disappear. Quite the contrary, because they are deprived even of 
discursive attention they remain unsolved and continue to generate new ones. In that way, 
the positive ethos eventually contributes to the reproduction of the existing order, including 
all its injustices, discrimination, inequalities. Additionally, the positive ethos, through its 
widespread usage in marketing, shows that calls for caution because of possibilities of its 
intentional manipulation should be taken seriously. 
It is surprising in the quote above, that two quite engaged representatives of new 
materialism, next to the commitment to the positive ethos, refer to the monological account 
as an example of a preferable overcoming of dualisms and divisions. It is clear, in a monolog 
no other side, no other voice can be heard, but this does not mean that they do not exist. It 
is rather the case that they are ignored or actively silenced. What is recommended in 
materialist ontology is a “monological account of emergent, generative material being.” But 
the question to be raised here is: if a monological account is recommended for all future 
emergent states of material being, and as matter is considered active, intra-active, this means 
that new states will constantly emerge, how can this monological account grasp those 
different states.? If all future states of material being have to be subjected to the monological 
account, the differences will be discursively erased. A further consequence will be that in 
this way matter will be again discursively deprived of those features which new materialists 
revived after they were, in their view, ignored for a long time. Thus, ironically enough, by 
insisting on the “monological account of emergent, generative material being” new 
materialists work against their own assumption and become entangled in contradictions. 
This is another example of a peculiar thinking pattern new materialists are putting forward. 
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It seems that their attentional and conceptual focus on matter has generated substantional 
weakness on the side of self-reflection. Given the political agenda new materialists are 
committed to, the relevance of this weakness transcends the pure logical and theoretical 
domain.  
Flat ontology  
The new materialisms have turned to matter as their core subject-matter forgotten during 
the dominance of discursive approaches, which, in their view, neglected material and 
somatic realities while privilegening language and discourses. Iris van der Tuin explained 
that “the new materialism wants to move away from such linguisticism” (Tuin, 2011, p. 
271).  Next, new materialisms have rehabilitated processual, active, intra-active, vibrant, 
vital, even agentic features of matter unrecognized within classical materialism. As a 
consequence, they redistributed agency capacities among humans, non-humans and even 
things. This redistribution has brought about empowerment of things (thing-power) and 
decentering from humans considered for a long time to be the only subjects with agentic 
status. By the new materialists conceptual redistributions are affected -- not just ontological 
categories including matter, living matter, non-humans, and humans  ̶  but also logical 
categories of genera and species: 
 
while an ontology based on relations between general types and particular instances is 
hierarchical, each level representing a different ontological category (organism, species, genera), 
an approach in terms of interacting parts and emergent wholes leads to a flat ontology, one made 
exclusively of unique, singular individuals, differing in spatio-temporal scale but not in 
ontological status. (DeLanda, 2004, p. 58) 
 
Flat ontology is certainly one of the most challenging claims characterizing new 
materialisms. This conceptual egalitarian move has a strong ethical and political appeal, but 
the question is whether it has discursive power sufficient to shake hierarchies in material 
reality, not to mention their abolition. Given the rising social inequalities recorded all over 
the world, and most dramatically during the Covid-19 pandemic, in which supposedly all 
are in the same boat, the question whether flat ontology has discursive power sufficient to 
shake hierarchies in material reality turns to be a pure rhetorical one. Ironically enough, the 
material turn can generate discursive turns only, while material, including somatic realities 
continue to be reproduced as hierarchies among and within their vibrant wholes. It seems 
the discovery of vibrant processes in matter has not led to emergence of vibrant changes in 
socio-political realities, sufficient to overthrow hierarchies and inequalities.  Regrettably 
enough, social ontology is not a flat ontology. A recent example: “On a day when the US 
announced economic growth overall had collapsed by a record-setting 32.9%, Amazon 
reported a profit of $5.2bn for the quarter and sales of $88.9bn, 40% higher than the same 
period last year” (The Guardian, 30. July 2020, no pagination). 
What is then the status and function of the model of flat ontology within hierarchical social 
ontology? It could be that egalitarian appeal of flat ontology – even beyond social equality 
– instead of inititating processes of removing and changing structures generating social 
inequalities obscures their very existence and in this way inhibits approaches which are 
motivated by the recognition of existence of hierarchical structures and commitments to 
work toward their change. This is a special challenge to those new materialist orientations 
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which are explicitly committed to political changes and are characterized as critical 
materialism (Coole & Frost, 2010).  
There is another aspect of flat ontology of new materialisms which is understood by Paul 
Rekret as a failure with significant socio-political implications: “I take as a crippling lacuna 
at the core of the new materialism paradigm: the absence of any account of the division of 
the mental and material as itself situated upon the terrain of social struggle or antagonism” 
(Rekret, 2018, p. 51). New materialism has ignored important insights of historical 
materialism  ̶  even behind reified phenomena there are social relations, and mostly 
antagonistic relations which cannot be made non-existent by declaring an egalitarian 
ontology and dismissing real contradictions at the core of societal order. 
Critique of anthropocentrism 
Another commitment of new materialisms is critique of anthropocentrism. It is closely 
related to flat ontology, obviously, as anthropocentrism is incompatible with flat ontology. 
Historically speaking, the first anthropocentric views originated in the fifth century B.C. in 
Greek philosophy, whose most famous dictum was Protagora’s claim: “Man is the measure 
of all things, of the things that are that they are and of the things that are not that they are 
not” (Plato, Theaetetus 151e, Sextus Against the Mathematicians VII.60 (=DK 80B1). 
However, it was only modernity that  developed anthropocentrism as a powerful epochal 
agenda. Therefore, new materialists critique and rejection of anthropocentrism is also 
directed against modernity. At the same time, while sharing with postmodernism a 
decentred position for humans, new materialists are very critical of the postmodern 
privileging of language.  
 An additional positioning of new materialism that is very relevant to its understanding and 
assessment is within the framework of anthropocene. It is within this framework that new 
materialists express their most important ecological concerns (Conty, 2018). The problems 
characterizing that period in natural history which is substantially determined by human 
activity (climate change, warming, pollution, deforestation, exhaustion of resources, 
endangered bio-diversity, shifts in contacts among species which bring about illnesses, 
including pandemic etc.) are indeed strong arguments against anthropocentrism.  In that 
sense, the critical position of new materialists is wholly justified. However, paradoxically 
enough, the anthropocene problems cannot be solved unless the cause of the problems, i.e. 
human activity, human values and attitudes assume a central place in socio-political 
programs. “New materialists have provided some new conceptual tools to make the 
Anthropocene as a ‘hyperobject’ more understandable, and yet its Latourian strand has 
failed to provide a programmatic perspective“ (Devellennes & Dillet, 2018, p. 12).  
It is not matter itself, regardless how vibrant it might be, which can stop or reverse pollution 
or deforestation. Obviously, human life on our planet is not possible without human activity. 
The point is to change that activity, and that change is urgently needed, for sure. Thus, I 
would claim that anthropocene could provide arguments for a new centering of humans, a 
centering which would include all levels of context, natural and social ones, long term 
perspectives, a general reflective attitude, care as a modus vivendi instead of exploitation of 
nature and other humans alike. All these changes have to be accomplished at the level of 
human subjects as agents, but they are not their autopoetic achievements. In order to achieve 
those changes radical changes of societal orders are needed. And again, those societal 
changes cannot be generated by matter, but by human subjects. From the fact that matter 
influences humans, be that electrons or coal, does not follow that there is no substantiall 
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difference between causation as a capability of matter and intentionality as a capability of 
human subjects. Matter can be reconceptualised as active or intra-active agency, but what 
is needed are common, conscious, intentional activities of human subjects.  It is not even 
possible to conceptualize a program without assuming an intentional agency. In the same 
way as humans and the modus of organization of modern societies are responsible for the 
current crises, they cannot be exempted from responsibility for their solution. Dominant 
modern conceptualizations of matter as passive, bare stuff available to human interventions 
are not achievements of matter, but historical achievements of humans, whose accumulated 
effects shape environmental and societal crises humanity is facing nowadays. New 
conceptualizations of matter are not caused by matter itself but by intentional reflective 
activity of human actors. 
Technological materialization of matter has brought about unprecedented changes not just 
in environment, but more importantly in psychological functioning of human subjects. The 
mediation of basic mental functions – perception, memory, thinking, and emotion--
transforms both their structure and function, as convincingly demonstrated by Vygotsky 
(1931/1997) almost hundred years ago. It would be wise to bear in mind that no self-
consciousness can develop without sign-mediation. Thus, sign-mediation and more 
generally tool-mediation is a powerful mechanism which transforms psychic functions into 
specifically human cultural functions, distinguishing them from natural functions which 
humans share with higher species of animals (Jovanović, 2019).  
In contrast, new materialisms argue for equal status of inorganic and organic matter, non-
human nature and human culture. But such a position does not allow us to account for the 
existence of humans and human culture. In a world based on a supposed flat ontology, 
humans and human culture could not have appeared at all. In other words, new materialisms 
cannot explain developmental processes which necessarily imply structural differentiation 
between higher and lower stages, expressed also in differences between non-living matter 
and living matter and then differentiation among species of living matter.   
The necessity not to erase differences in the status of matter or technics and humans is even 
more urgent when it comes to bio-technology. As bio-politics is one of the main concerns 
of new materialism, it is also a challenge to it. Rather than advocating responsibility of non-
human actants, it is urgent to put humans at the centre – both as the subjects and objects of 
bio-politics. And again, the best possible univerzalization of humans is necessary, i.e., a 
concept of humans in which different articulations of the human could be recognized.    
Another inconsistency appears when new materialists position themselves, as already 
mentioned, as sharp critics of cultural, discursive and socio-constructionist turns. In their 
view: 
 
Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the semiotic turn, the 
interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn lately every “thing”– even 
materiality – is turned into a matter of language or some other form of cultural representation”. 
(Barad, 2003, p. 801) 
 
However, to Sara Ahmed “Barad is offering a caricature of ‘the turns’ in recent 
theory”(Ahmed, 2008, p. 34) . Nevertheless, new materialists consider previous turns “being 
deemed inadequate for understanding contemporary society, particularly in light of some of 
its most urgent challenges regarding environmental, demographic, geopolitical, and 
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economic change” (Coole & Frost, 2010, p. 3). Against such a critical positioning it is 
striking that new materialists hardly note the fact that the material turn they are committed 
to is itself a discursive turn. The tools used in that turn are discursive tools. To be sure, 
language and discourse cannot be escaped by declaring a material turn. But at the same time 
it is true that different discursive tools draw conceptual attention and nurture sensitivity to 
different apects of the processes in the world, co-constituting in that way different symbolic 
realities, which are indispensable dimensions of reality humans live in. For seeing matter as 
passive stuff or as vibrant intra-activity discursive eyes are necessary. Before appropriate 
discursive tools became available vibrant intra-activity of matter was not visible to humans.  
Matter did not leave its previous passive status and did not start in itself vibrating at the 
beginning of the millennium. New discursive tools could grasp intra-activity of matter, 
while previous tools were capable of seeing just passive matter.  An instructive example is 
the transition from a geocentric to a heliocentric model of the universe. Obviously, earth did 
not start revolving in 1543 when Nicolaus Copernicus published his seminal work  De 
revolutionibus orbium coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres) marking the 
transition to the heliocentric model.  
The very signification “this is a material turn” performs a speech act (Searle, 1995). And it 
is thanks to this act that constitution of features of a specifically human social reality is 
possible at all. Even the decentring of humans cannot escape its discursive constitution and 
therefore it cannot transform human social reality into a reality existing independently of 
humans. New materialism is an aspect of that human reality, it could not and would not exist 
if there were no humans arguing for or against it.  
Even though there are claims made by new materialists of entanglement of matter and 
meaning (Barad, 2007), it is matter that matters. From the context of origin of new 
materialism it is clear that this was a reaction to the previous neglect of matter and proceses 
of materialization within socio-constructionist approaches. But the same could be said about 
the genesis of discursive and socio-constructionist approaches – they were also reactions to 
a long-lasting neglect of role of language and its formative functions in shaping human 
reality. The position of new materialism would be more convincing if it had not repeated 
the overreaction in an attempt to compensate for previous neglects. 
Beyond that, focusing on matter at the expense of a relative neglect of meaning in new 
materialism has particularly important implications for the understanding of humans and for 
political agendas that new materialists argue for as emancipatory projects. I would argue 
that without granting a proper place and acknowledging an indispensable role of meaning-
making processes and their symbolic articulations by human political agents, it is not even 
possible to conceive of political struggles and emancipatory projects. Nevertheless, it should 
be made clear that the critique of inconcsistencies in self-understanding of new 
materialisms, intended in this paper, does not imply that their critique of absolutist claims 
of discursive approaches should be dismissed. Instead, I will argue that a more reflective 
approach to the relation between material and discursive turns is needed. 
From these general self-positionings of new materialism I would conclude that new 
materialism is entangled in its inherent contradictions. In other words, it cannot 
consequently stand for its own assumptions and claims. Starting with a justified critique of 
absolutist claims of discursive approaches and anthropocentrism, new materialism is not 
attentive enough to differentiate between unjustified absolutist claims and justified rational 
insights of discursive approaches and modern anthropocentric agenda. It seems, it is not so 
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easy to avoid temptations of critique. Commitments to novelty, inscribed in the name of 
new materialism, makes the task even more difficult.  
Concluding remarks  
New materialisms are the most radical critiques of anthropocentrism as it was inaugurated 
in its historically unique generative form by modernity. Therefore they qualify to be 
considered as belonging to a broader turn named posthumanism. 
Posthumanism poses a radical challenge to psychology understood as a study of human 
experience and activity as they are occurring in historically- and culturally-constituted 
human worlds. Even though images of soul and spirits as forces populating humans, animals 
and even objects can be found since the oldest times of human prehistory, and philosophy 
served for a long time as a home for psychological speculations, genesis of psychology as a 
science is substantially embedded in structures of modern epoch. Without a socio-
historically constituted modern individual as the subject of experience and without the 
generalization of individual subjects in different domains of life (knowledge, art, economy, 
law, society as a whole) (Jovanović, 1997), psychology would not have been possible. 
Psychology is a product of modernity, but it is also a response to demands and problems of 
the new historical epoch (Danziger, 1990; Jaeger & Staueble, 1978; Rose, 1998). The 
response is not always a direct response, various hermeneutical and deep hermeneutical 
entanglements are possible – to mention just one example when Adorno saw in the boom of 
psychology an expression of rising inhumanity 
 
With the intensification of social antagonisms, clearly,the thoroughly liberal and individualistic 
concept of psychology tends increasingly to forfeit its meaning. The pre-bourgeois order does 
not yet know psychology, the over-socialized society knows it no longer. 
    Analytic revisionism is the counterpart of such a society. It is commensurate with the shifting 
relation between society and the individual.The social power-structure hardly needs the 
mediating agencies of ego and individuality any longer. An outward sign of this is, precisely, the 
spread of so-called ego-psychology, whereas in reality the individual psychological dynamic is 
replaced by the partly conscious and partly regressive adjustment of the individual to society. 
(Adorno, 1968, p. 95) 
 
In the same way as “the spread of so-called ego-psychology” did not strengthen the spread 
of strong individuality half a century ago, the proliferation of agencies via new 
materialism’s claims nowadays does not induce politically transformative agentic outcomes. 
It would be wise to be attentive to Rekret’s warnings: 
 
the new materialist claim that agency flourishes in the contemporary world risks functioning as 
an alibi for any investigation or political contestation of the increasingly complex and 
authoritarian forms by which our mental and manual labour and our relation to nature fall under 
capitalist control. (Rekret, 2028, p. 64-65). 
 
The social power structures have meantime become even more powerful  than half a century 
ago, when Adorno articulated these insights into the dynamics of relationship of society and 
individuals. Do new materialisms provide appropriate conceptual tools to grasp and possibly 
change the new destructive patterns? Is matter -- liberated from constraints of passivity, 
linear heterocausality and “reenchanted” with agentic capabilities -- a sufficient tool to 
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address powerful actors whose power does not derive from their somatic materiality but 
from positions in social relations? Certainly there are reified relations and positions but they 
acquire and exercise power not thanks to their materiality, but thanks to society which 
evaluates some matter and some bodies more worthy and some others less worthy, or even 
unworthy of living. Criteria of evaluation are not given in matter itself. Evaluation is indeed 
a feature of human subjects in their engagement with things, other subjects and the world. 
(Taylor, 1985). 
Even though changes in natural sciences, including new conceptualizations of matter, could 
become a source of inspiration for changes in social and human sciences, as hoped by Barad 
(2007), such a hope already presupposes a flat ontology, i.e., the idea that there is no 
substantial ontological and axiological difference between non-living matter and human 
beings. But there are no reasons why this assumption should be exempted from critical 
reappraisal – in the same way as anthropocentrism should be and has been subjected to a 
critical reappraisal. 
Indeed, I would argue, the new materialism’s critique of old materialism, then of the 
discursive turn and modern anthropocentrism, cannot provide the foundations for a 
sustainable emancipatory program for many reasons. What is missing are both material and 
normative foundations. Matter can be proclaimed to be active or intra-active, but it is the 
social position of poor people which allows their lives to be dominated by a dramatic lack 
of matter, of basic material goods, including water, and food, and shelter. It is not that after 
matter has been declared active that it starts building houses, even though obviously matter 
is a necessary material. To make that matter be “active”, i.e. working for the homeless, 
radical political changes are necessary, i.e. changes in social structures that generate 
conditions of work and life, making some bodies, actually bodies of many human subjects 
unworthy of material shelter.  
The request for change of existing dominant politics is a strong normative claim, whose 
source cannot be matter, as expected by new materialists. Even intra-active matter lacks 
self-evaluation capability necessary for normative acts which constitute emancipation. It is 
normativity that introduces a radical discontinuity into social ontology. By erasing –
voluntaristically – that discountinuity, new materialisms remain bound to political 
“quietists”, as rightly criticized by Rekret (2018). 
  
The question that arises for the new materialism is thus: under which conditions can 
technological advances become emancipatory rather than disciplinary, and which social and 
political theory would enable this healing pharmacological dimension to emerge? (Devellennes 
& Dillet, 2018, p. 15) 
 
To conclude I will argue: new materialism, in the plurality of its strands, cannot stand on its 
own basic ontological and political claims. The emancipatory project of the transformation 
of the social totality still lacks both its firm theoretical foundations and sustainable 
materialization. 
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